Second, Section 3 provides that if ninety days of bargaining between a certified union representative and the employer do not result in a collective bargaining agreement, either party may petition the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). The FMCS initially would provide mediation services, but if the parties do not come to a voluntary agreement, it would be required to refer the dispute to an arbitration panel that "shall render a decision settling the dispute" for a two-year period.
Third, Section 4 requires the Board to seek preliminary injunctions to reinstate workers discharged during organizing and election campaigns. It authorizes the agency to levy liquidated damages of twice back pay owed to those discharged workers and, in the case of willful or repeated employer violations, to impose a civil penalty of up to $20,000 per violation.
As of this writing, it is not clear whether the EFCA as proposed will be enacted.
Much depends on whether its proponents can in fact marshal a filibuster-proof majority of sixty votes in the Senate and, if not, whether a compromise can be struck that will garner the necessary support. This Article does not take a position on whether the EFCA should become law. It instead identifies changes the NLRB can implement on its own, without statutory amendment, to improve its administration of the NLRA in its core functions of resolving questions concerning representation and enforcing the Act's prohibitions against employer and union misconduct. NLRB representation elections will happen regardless of whether the EFCA becomes law. Even at the stage of initial organization, some unions and employee groups will continue to pursue the election route because they wish to obtain the greater legitimacy and bargaining leverage that a victorious secret-ballot election confers on the bargaining agent. Moreover, elections will still be needed to decide whether to decertify unions or to de-authorize unionsecurity arrangements.
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As the Board continues to hold elections, it is important to determine whether it can hold them more quickly, how it can handle unit certification and other issues more expeditiously, whether it can provide union organizers greater and earlier access to employees, and whether it can enhance remedies for unlawful employer and union conduct that mars fair election conditions. Similarly, the Board will still need to address bargaining obligations under the Act, whatever the EFCA's legislative fate. Even under a first-contract interest-arbitration regime, issues of bargaining obligation are likely to arise during the early stages when the parties attempt to negotiate or secure arbitral imposition of a first contract, and the resolution of those issues may inform what the arbitration panel includes in a first contract.
12 When all contracts are up for renewal-whether those 11 For a proposal conducive to an "easy in, easy out" approach to representation elections, see Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 50. 12 As an example of how bargaining issues may be considered, see section 43 (2) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, which provides for consideration of the employer's (or union's) unreasonable bargaining as a factor in whether to direct a first-contract interest arbitration:
(2) The Board shall consider and make its decision on an application under subsection (1) within 30 days of receiving the application and it shall direct the settlement of a first collective agreement by arbitration where, irrespective of whether section 17 has been contravened, it appears to the Board that the process of collective bargaining has been unsuccessful because of, negotiated by the parties or those imposed by arbitrations the first time around-the NLRB will still need to determine whether a party has satisfied its duty to bargain in good faith, and identify appropriate remedies for any violations. The scope of any legislative change depends in significant part on the degree of confidence the players in the system have in the utility and fairness of the Board's administration of existing law, and their views of the suitability of that law to current conditions. 19 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-637, at 55 (1977) (requiring an election to be held within twenty-one days after filing of petition if petitioned-for unit was defined as appropriate in a rule or prior decision in the industry; in other cases, the election would be held within forty-five days unless issues of exceptional novelty or complexity were presented); S.
REP. NO. 95-628, at 50-51 (1978) (same, except providing for a period of twenty-one to thirty days in cases where a rule defined the requested unit as appropriate). 20 The problem may not be with average or median periods but with highly contested cases. See discussion and JUNE 30, 1947 JUNE 30, , at 3 (1948 . During the Taft-Hartley deliberations, Congress rejected a provision in conference that would have expressly authorized such elections. Explaining the conference committee's actions, Senator Taft insisted that the committee was not changing existing law:
Section 9(c)(4): The conferees dropped from this section a provision authorizing pre-hearing elections. That omission has brought forth the charge that we have thereby greatly impeded the Board in its disposition of representation matters. We have not changed the words of existing law providing a hearing in every case unless waived by stipulation of the parties. It is the function of hearings in representation cases to determine Section 9(c)(1) plainly requires the Board to hold "an appropriate hearing" prior to the election to satisfy itself that a question concerning representation exists. The issue is whether more is required in this pre-election hearing other than to determine whether the labor organization has petitioned for an election in a unit whose appropriateness is well-established under agency case law, whether the agency has statutory jurisdiction in the particular case, and to mandate the sealing of any challenged ballots, including challenges based on eligibility issues. If the respondent believes that the facts of its case require some variance from well-established Board law, that matter, if properly preserved, could be taken up after the election in a second-stage pre-certification inquiry.
Functionally, this pre-certification inquiry would be similar to the situation where the Board grants a request for review from the regional director's decision directing an whether an election may properly be held at the time; and if so, to decide questions of unit and eligibility to vote. During the last year the Board has tried out a device of holding the election first and then providing the hearing to which the parties were entitled by law. Since its use has been confined to an inconsequential percentage of cases, and more often than not a subsequent hearing was still necessary and because the House conferees strenuously objected to its continuance it was omitted from the bill. The Board should study the characteristics of the cases that take the longest time.
For example, in 2008, 12.4 percent of the cases took longer than the median time to go to election and took longer than three weeks from the election for the results to be certified.
As 
Unfair labor practice cases
Delay in the system in connection with unfair labor practices could occur at several stages: (1) the period between filing a charge and issuing a complaint; (2) Changes with an opportunity for public comment. Cases presenting issues listed on this Agenda would be prime targets for issuance of a complaint and expedited consideration.
Oral argument and briefing would be scheduled for every case on the Agenda thought to be a vehicle for a policy reversal. To focus attention and avoid repetition, any oral argument should be limited to one hour for each side of the issue. Thus, absent special circumstances, the General Counsel and the charging party would be limited to a half hour each, and the respondent to one hour. Any amici wishing to argue would need to secure consent of the party to share its time.
II.

Substantive changes in NLRB policy
I address here only three of the several areas of Board policy that should be revisited: union access rules, voluntary "framework" agreements subject to "ex post authorization," and remedies.
A. Access rules
The Supreme Court has made clear that unless employees are living near worksites distant from the usual means of communication, the Board cannot hold employers in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA if, without discrimination, they refuse to allow nonemployee union organizers on their property to address employees.
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The Court has not purported, however, to alter the scope of the Board's authority, 45 first announced in General Shoe Corp., 46 to establish under section 9 of the NLRA the preconditions ("laboratory conditions") under which it will certify the results of an election rather than hold a re-run election. Under this doctrine, the Board can overturn elections not conforming to "laboratory conditions" whether or not an unfair labor practice has been committed and presumably without regard to statutory limits on its ULP authority, such as the so-called "employer free speech" provision, section 8(c) of the NLRA. 47 The Board has used its General Shoe authority to bar massed-assembly In the Excelsior context, the Board reasoned, employees' section 7 interests were centrally involved, thus altering the balance between employer interests and section 7 rights:
[E]ven assuming that there is some legitimate employer interest in nondisclosure, we think it relevant that the subordination of that interest which we here require is limited to a situation in which employee interests in self-organization are shown to be substantial. For, whenever an election is directed (the precondition to disclosure) the Regional Director has found that a real question concerning representation exists . Nutone was not limited to the situation in which employee organizational interests were substantial . . . .
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By similar reasoning, the Board could claim authority under General Shoe to declare that a fair election process requires that once a union has presented a showing of interest sufficient to trigger a representation election, the interests of the employee electorate in making an informed decision require that the union be given limited access to the employees on the company premises to present its case. 54 Similar to the access rules often sought by unions in "neutrality" agreements, the union's access could be limited to nonwork areas like the parking lot, cafeteria and break room, and could be conditioned on compliance with reasonable security procedures. Because union access under this proposal would be triggered by the Board's determination of an interest requirement rather than any particular expressive activity of the employer, there should be no serious section 8(c) concern with this application of the General Shoe doctrine. bargaining agreement, and that bargaining would not take place until the union obtains bargaining authority; and (2) "ex post authorization"-the agreement must expressly provide an opportunity for the employees to decide later, preferably by secret ballot, whether they wish to authorize the union's bargaining authority.
This approach would impart valuable information to employees to guide their decision, because the framework agreement would illuminate the union's bargaining objectives and its likely efficacy as a bargaining agent. It would also provide an opportunity for the parties to explore new approaches to a bargaining relationship, especially at new sites of employment.
57
C. Remedies
Remedies are the linchpin. A law is only as good as its remedies, and the NLRB's remedial authority as practiced seems particularly deficient. Even here, the agency can do a good deal more with its statutory authority than it has in the past. REV. 827, 834-40 (1996) , 1951-2007, at 5, 10-11 (2009) A combination of the three remedial proposals offers a promising start. In addition to the "extraordinary" remedies now in use, the Board would be able to (1) reinstate employees preliminarily when there is reasonable cause to believe an employer discharged the person in violation of section 8(a)(3); (2) impose a bargaining obligation on the employer because of the absence of good-faith doubt, as evidenced by employer ULPs, in appropriate cases backed up by a petition for interim injunctive relief; and (3) employ an advisory ruling procedure to inform employees whether the Board is likely to treat the strike they are engaged in as an ULP strike. Together, the options would go far in allowing the Board to structure a meaningful remedy even in first-time bargaining situations.
Conclusion
These proposals are by no means exhaustive; more can be said and other ideas pursued. In any event, the NLRA has not "ossified," as some in academic circles have claimed. Rather, its principal guardians, the members of the NLRB and General Counsel, need to take seriously their mandate to make this statute work as well as it can.
[TABLES TO INSERT] Source: NLRB data (on file with author). 
